Is the UAE’s Gas Deal in Syria a Masterstroke for Washington’s Middle East Strategy?
The United States and the United Kingdom are doubling down on their efforts to solidify the strategic advantage they gained in the Middle East by sidelining Russia’s key ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, last December. Syria, a linchpin in the region’s political, economic, religious, and security landscape, also serves as a vital bridge to Africa and Europe, thanks to its extensive Mediterranean coastline. As I explore in depth in my latest book on The New Global Oil Market Order (https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0C2RRNWNY), the key to keeping Syria aligned with Western interests lies in rebuilding its economy through investment and on-the-ground support from Western firms. A particular focus is on reviving Syria’s former economic lifeblood: gas and oil exports. Conveniently for the West, these projects also provide a legal pretext to station ‘security’ personnel at investment sites, along with any additional assets deemed necessary to protect operations. But here’s where it gets controversial: Washington and London claim to have learned from their missteps in Iraq and Libya, where prolonged Western interventions were increasingly viewed as neo-colonial occupations by local populations. This time, they’re bringing Arab states into the fold to soften perceptions of Western dominance. Enter the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose energy giant Dana Gas recently signed a preliminary deal with Syria’s state oil company to redevelop the country’s natural gas fields.
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Syria’s gas fields, alongside its oil reserves, were the backbone of its economy for years, and they emerged from the 13-year civil war with less damage than their oil counterparts. Before the conflict, Syria produced around 316 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) of dry natural gas, with proven reserves of 8.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf). Russia, keenly aware of Syria’s strategic value—including its oil reserves and Mediterranean coastline—had already established a significant presence before the war began in 2011. For instance, Stroytransgaz started developing Syria’s South-Central Gas Area in 2009, boosting natural gas production by 40% by 2011. This allowed Syria’s combined gas and oil exports to generate a quarter of government revenues, making it the eastern Mediterranean’s top energy producer at the time. After Russia’s heavy military intervention to prop up al-Assad, the two countries signed the 2015 Cooperation Plan, which included restoring at least 40 energy facilities (focusing initially on gas but also covering offshore oil fields) and expanding the power sector. The deal also aimed to rehabilitate the Aleppo thermal plant, install the Deir Ezzor power plant, and expand the Mharda and Tishreen plants to revitalize Syria’s power grid and restore its control center to Damascus. In essence, from the West’s perspective, Russia has already laid—and paid for—much of the groundwork for expansion.
The same holds true for Syria’s oil sector. The 2015 Cooperation Plan included repairing and upgrading the Homs oil refinery (Syria’s other refinery was in Banias), with targets of 140,000 barrels per day (bpd) in Phase 1, 240,000 bpd in Phase 2, and 360,000 bpd in Phase 3. Russia intended the refinery to process Iranian oil from Iraq for shipment to southern Europe. Before the civil war, Syria was a major oil producer, pumping around 400,000 bpd from proven reserves of 2.5 billion barrels. Earlier, it had produced nearly 600,000 bpd before recovery rates declined due to a lack of advanced extraction techniques. Europe imported over $3 billion worth of Syrian oil annually until early 2011, with many refineries configured to process Syria’s heavy, sour ‘Souedie’ crude and lighter ‘Syrian Light’ grade. Most of this oil—around 150,000 bpd—went to Germany, Italy, and France via Syria’s three Mediterranean export terminals: Banias, Tartus, and Latakia. International oil companies, including Shell, Petrofac, Gulfsands Petroleum, Total, China National Petroleum Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Corp, Suncor Energy, Tatneft, and Stroytransgaz, were all active in Syria’s energy sector before the war.
With much of this infrastructure still intact—and conveniently paid for by Moscow—it’s no surprise that U.S. President Donald Trump lifted sanctions on Syria’s gas and oil sector on May 13. The UK and the EU had already done the same. Trump’s announcement in Riyadh underscored his commitment to involving other Middle Eastern states in Syria’s future. Saudi Arabia, for instance, argues that a stabilized Syria would benefit the Kingdom by enabling its own projects and facilitating energy exports to Europe. The UAE shares this interest, making it a key player in Trump’s broader Middle Eastern strategy. This strategy aims to build interconnected economic and political relationships across the region, with the U.S. and its allies at the center. This aligns with the Abraham Accords, which Trump championed during his first term, as detailed in my book (https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0C2RRNWNY). In this context, the UAE’s Dana Gas is an ideal partner for the West, having played a pivotal role in gas redevelopment projects in Egypt and Iraq, two other critical targets in the West’s ‘new global oil order.’ In Iraq, Dana Gas has operated successfully in the volatile Kurdistan region, recently announcing gas sales from the Khor Mor expansion project.
Ultimately, these moves in Syria could deliver three major wins for the U.S. and its allies. First, they position these countries at the heart of Syria’s economic revival, allowing them to shape its future policies. Second, they integrate key Arab nations into the regeneration of a historically significant regional player, easing the rollout of Trump’s vision through Abraham Accord-like deals. And third, they deny Russia these strategic advantages. In the zero-sum world of geopolitics and energy diplomacy, this is a significant victory for the West. But here’s the question: Is this a sustainable strategy, or will it reignite tensions in an already volatile region? Share your thoughts in the comments—I’d love to hear your take.
